^[i]Wuzara^ (sing, wazir): the term is more often translated as "minister”, but that implies (at least in English) a sort of subordination incompatible with Ibn ’Arabi’s insistence that ’’the wuzara’ are the guides (al-hudaf) and He is the 'guided one' (al-Mahdi)” (III, p. 329.27-28). Instead, the relationship described at the beginning of this chapter often seems to reflect the type of polity in which the ruler was seen as enforcing or applying policies prescribed by his "vizier.” On a more profound level, which Ibn 'Arabi brings out only gradually in the course the middle section (II, 1-9 below), all of the accomplished saints may seen as at least partial "representatives” or "helpers” of the Mahdi (or "Imam”: see notes 11, 14-15, 18, 67), insofar as they realize these (and other) essential spiritual functions.

^[ii]In this chapter, as in much of Ibn 'Arabi's work, it would be quite misleading to translate this term (or the related expression al-shar': see notes 75 and 105 below) simply as religious or revealed "Law” without some further explanation or qualification. The shari'a, as Ibn 'Arabi uses the term here, is distinguished from what we ordinarily conceive of as "law” by (a) its breadth of reference to aft the divine norms or precepts (ahкат) for human behavior, but especially those having to do with divine worship (’ibada) and the infinite variety of man's inner, spiritual or psychic "actions”, which are often without any

immediately visible, outward manifestations (which is why one can speak, for example, of the ’’Sharia” of Jesus); (b) its unconcern (or at least lack of apparent specification) concerning the majority of the worldly matters which are ordinarily (and necessarily) covered by civil laws and/or social customs; and (c) the intrinsic distance between the eternal reality and divine Source of the Sharia (which is the constant focus of Ibn ’Arabi’s concern) and the multitude of its various historical, popularly accepted images or applications. (This latter contrast is closely paralleled in his treatment of such Koranic expressions as ’’the Pure Religion” and ’’the Religion of God”, at notes 8 and 97 below.) Ibn ’Arabi’s understanding of these questions is further clarified in C. Chodkiewicz’ translations of chapters XX and XX of the Futuhat in this anthology.

Now Ibn 'Arabi’s understanding, on each of these points, differs substantially from the typical perspective of the later historical disciplines of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh, usul al-figh, etc.), and much of the central part of this chapter (section II, 1-9) is particularly devoted to bringing out the differences between the conceptions of the Sufis ("People of Unveiling”, etc.) and the jurists of his day (Tuqaha’ al- zaman). However his approach to questions of fiqh in other connections is frequently more irenic: for a more balanced and comprehensive discussion of his treatment of Islamic law, see the excellent summary by M. Chodkiewicz, "Ibn 'Arabi, la lettre et la loi”, pp. 27-40 in Actes du collogue 'Mystique, culture et society, ed. M. Meslin, Paris, 1983. (A number of the references below to related legal discussions in other chapters of the Futuhat are drawn from that survey.)

³See our much more detailed discussion of all these questions, with reference both to chapter 367 and to many other related sections of the Futuhat, in our article "Ibn 'Arabi's 'Esotericism': The Problem of Spiritual Authority,” to appear in an abridged version in Studia Islamica [...complete references], and in its full length in our forthcoming Introduction to Islamic Esotericism.

^[iv]III, pp. 327.10-340.12; the contents of the untranslated passages are summarized in the body of the translation (between square brackets) or indicated in footnotes. The title in Ibn ^?Arabi^?s original "Table of Contents” (fjhrist: O.Y. ed., I, 107) adds that "this is from the Muhammadan Presence"—i.e., pertaining to the universal Source of all Revelation (the haqiqa muhammadiya), which encompasses the spiritual "realities" of all the other prophets and their revelations; see the detailed illustration of this in the Fusus al-Hikam. The special universal significance of this "Muhammadan" stage is further illuminated in the following chapter 367 (see the translation and commentary in this anthology), which contains the key autobiographical account of Ibn ^?Arabi^?s own spiritual Ascension (mi’rai) leading to his culminating realization of the "Muhammadan Station" and of the inner spiritual meaning of the (universal noetic "Qur’an."

^[v]Here we have included only the following brief passages dealing with this subject, which are essential for understanding the rest of this chapter: III, 327.16-17, 26-32; 328.11-18; 329.26-28; 331.7-12. In fact, most of this long opening section (III, 327.10-331.33, or more than a third of the entire chapter) is devoted to the quotation of hadith and related eschatological material concerning the Mahdi and the Dajjal—traditional materials which would give the casual reader no reason to suspect the controversial subjects that are to follow (in section II below). (For further discussion of the structure and rhetorical methods and intentions underlying this sort of construction, see our article on "Ibn ’Arabi’s 'Esotericism'..." cited in n. 3 above.

^[vi]This description and the many additional characteristics given in the passage omitted here are taken literally from the numerous hadith concerning the Mahdi (see Wensinck, Concordance, s.v., and article "al-Mahdi" by W. Madelung in El², V, pp. 1230-1238. Most relevant to the following discussion is the fact that the hadith selected by Ibn ’Arabi all emphasize the Mahdi's close resemblance to the Prophet especially in his intrinsic character and nature (khuluq). so that "he walks in the footsteps of the Messenger of God, and makes no mistake, and he is guided by an unseen angel"—a description that Ibn Arabi mentions repeatedly in the course of this chapter as proof of the Mahdi's divine "protection from error" (’isma). Clearly Ibn Arabi sees Muhammad as the exemplary illustration of all the characteristics (both of the Mahdi and of his Helpers) discussed here—a point that takes on added importance in light of the brief allusion (at n. 17 below) to Ibn ’Arabi's own unique complementary role as the "Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood."

^[vii]The jizya—literally, "compensation" (for remaining non-Muslim)—required of each individual from the peoples of the protected religions under the various systems of Islamic law; see the long article

’’Diizva’’ in EE;, pp. 559 ff.

^[viii]For the full significance of Ibn ’Arabi’s use of the Koranic expression "the Pure Religion" (al-Din ahkhahs), see the references at n. 98 below; sections II-7 and II-9 are an extended commentary on the situation to which he briefly alludes here.

"Schools" here translates the Arabic madhahib: Ibn 'Arabi sometimes applies this term more broadly to all the "ways" or individual forms of religious belief and/or practice, but here, judging from what follows (especially sections II-7 and II-9 below), he clearly seems to be referring more specifically to the widely accepted "schools of law" (Hanafi, Maliki, etc.) in Islam.

^[ix]muqallidat al-'ulama' ahl al-ijtihad: the 'ulama' in this case clearly refer to the jurists following the respective founders (the "imams" al-Malik, al-Shafi'i, etc.) of the established Islamic legal schools, all of which, for Ibn 'Arabi, were originally grounded in the effort of independent legal judgment (ijtihad) of the early Muslim jurists, based on their use of personal opinion (ra'v) or rational analogy and inference (qiyas) concerning the supposed grounds of the particular divine commandments or prescriptions (hukm/ahkam). In several of the following sections, Ibn 'Arabi goes on to contrast their approach (whether or not they still admit the possibility of ijtihad) with the immediate—and necessarily individual and specific—divine inspiration characterizing the judgments of the Mahdi, the Prophet and the awliya'. The roots of his criticism of the 'ulama' and their ijtihad (in this legalist sense) are brought out in much greater detail in sections II-7 and 9 below.

Ibn 'Arabi's own very different conception of the individual spiritual obligation of ijtihad (and his contrasting sharp criticisms of any claims to an obligation of taqlid on the part of others) are explained in much greater detail, along with their bases in the Koran and hadith, in our article cited at n. 3 above.

^[x]The long intervening passage (to III, p. 328.11) continues with some of the traditional hadith materials concerning the battles of the Mahdi and the descent of Jesus at the end of time, concluding with Ibn 'Arabi's own enigmatic statement that "(the Mahdi's) age has already come to you, and his time overshadows you." (Rather than reflecting any particular Messianic hopes or assumptions, this aside seems to foreshadow Ibn 'Arabi's subsequent allusions to the perennial manifestation of the Mahdi's spiritual functions through the accomplished saints (awliya') and the "Imam" or "Imam of the Age"—terms which Ibn 'Arabi actually employs much more frequently than "al-Mahdi" throughout the long middle section (II, 1-9) of this chapter).

ⁿThe latter part of this phrase (rhyming in the original) apparently alludes to the Koranic mention (Kor. 27:16-17) of Solomon's power over the armies of the jinn and his inspired knowledge of the "language of the birds" (mantiq al-tayr)—Solomon being another prototype of this divinely inspired earthly ruler. (Ibn 'Arabi himself constantly reiterates—referring both to Koranic allusions and to his own mystical experience—that all created beings, even minerals or letters, for example, are "alive" and "speaking.")

On the metaphysical plane, at least, this description of the Mahdi seems to correspond to certain of Ibn 'Arabi's remarks concerning the lofty station of the "Imam of the Left" in the spiritual hierarchy, the "sword of the Pole," who is responsible for the order and maintenance of this world: see Chodkiewicz, Sceau, ch. VI, and Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 109-110. (See also notes 15-16 below.)

^[xii]The nature of this "victorious support" (nasr, a term combining the notions of divine assistance and the "victory" resulting from that support), as Ibn 'Arabi understands it, is explained in his long discussion of the spiritual virtue of sidq (truthfulness and inner sincerity of intention) in the immediately following section (III, 238.18-239.25), summarized here. See also chapter 152 of the Futuhat (II, 246 ff.), where nasr is treated as one of the distinctive characteristics of walava (i.e., the saints' inner "proximity"

to God) and of their spiritual "authority" (wilava) in general. Throughout this section regarding the conjunction of faith, true inner sincerity, and divine support (as in this chapter more generally), Ibn 'Arabi clearly has in mind the paradigmatic example of the Prophet and his Companions.

^[xiii]The description of this hafiz cannot but recall Ibn 'Arabi's repeated insistence on his own spiritual realization—which he apparently viewed as unique in his own time—of the rare condition of "pure servanthood" f'abd mahd khahs) or absolute "spiritual sincerity" (ikhlas), without any trace of inner opposition to the divine Lordship. See his revealing autobiographical remarks about this in chapters 311 (III, 26-27), 367 (III, 350; section IV-I in our translation here), and 29 (O.Y. ed. Ill, 228-229) of the Futuhat, along with additional references in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 765-778.

^[xiv]hihir: i.e., their constantly repeated formula of divine invocation (dhikr), or simply their spiritually representative "motto" from the Koran. See Ibn 'Arabi's detailed discussions of the "hrjjirs"— which are all symbolically significant verses from the Koran—of the seven abdal, in chapter 15 of the Futuhat (O. Yahya edition, II, 381-384), and especially of a long series of different spiritual "Poles" (aqtab), in chapters 464-556 (Cairo ed., IV, 88-195). In addition, there also is an apparent pun here on another possible reading of the same Arabic written form as "midday sun" (haiir).

^[xv]al-Imam al-Mahdi: in the rest of this chapter Ibn 'Arabi more often refers to this figure simply as "the Imam" (i.e., the "guide" or leader) or "the Imam of the Age" (see n. 19), without any specific

reference to the "Mahdi"; in doing so he seems to be alluding—as likewise in the poem opening the chapter, and in the following reference to the "Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood" (n. 16)—to the broader spiritual reality or function symbolized by the Mahdi as the "Greatest Imam" (al-Imam al-Akbar) or rather as a particular manifestation or "deputy" (na'ib) of the Pole (Qutb): as such, the term subsumes, among other things, the various spiritual virtues of the awliva' and the "people of unveiling" described throughout this chapter. For a more detailed account of the Shaykh's complex understanding of the "Imamate" in this broader spiritual sense, see the references in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 101-114 and 1103-1107 (especially pp. 104-105 and 111), and Chodkiewicz, Sceau, ch. VI-VII.

^[xvi]For a detailed exposition of Ibn 'Arabi's self-conception of his unique role as Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood, see the discussions and extensive references in Chodkiewicz, Sceau, ch. VII- IX, as well as the related entries in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 373-383. (For the many relevant senses of the key term hukm, usually translated here as "judgment," see n. 96 below.)

^[xvii]See also Ibn 'Arabi's further remarks on the special role of the Koran in his spiritual life in section II-7 below. Here, as throughout the Shaykh's writings, the expression "Qur'an" refers not simply to the sacred Book revealed through Muhammad, but more broadly to its underlying spiritual Reality, which for Ibn 'Arabi is ultimately inseparable from the universal Logos or "Muhammadan Reality" and "Perfect Man": see the references in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 903-909.

More specifically, he often stresses the etymological root sense of "al-Our'an" (in implicit contrast to the parallel Koranic expression al-Furqan, the "Division" or "Separation") as a reference to the comprehensive, universal aspect of the divine Reality, which for him is also symbolically expressed in the divine Name "God" (Allah). This distinction underlies his repeated insistence in the following paragraphs (see n. 20 below) on his own superlative knowledge of "Allah" in particular—i.e., the comprehensive divine Reality—rather than of any of the specific divine Names and their manifestations. (See the further discussions of these key distinctions in Wm. Chittick's translation from chapter 558 [IV, 196-198] elsewhere in this anthology.)

^[xviii]After briefly alluding to the Prophet's doubts concerning the exact number of years of the Mahdi's reign ("5, 7, or 9 years," according to a hadith included in the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal, III, p. 21; see n. 20 below), and the corresponding uncertainty concerning the exact number of the Mahdi's Helpers, Ibn 'Arabi returns to a lengthy quotation (III, 329.31-331.6) of the hadith and traditional accounts concerning the Mahdi's encounters with the Antichrist (al-Daiial): see the summary of these materials in

the corresponding article in EI^ (A.J. Wensinck) and EI^ (A.Abel).

^[xix]Imam al-Waqt: i.e., the "Pole” (Qutb) or "Lord of the Age,” etc.: for the different meanings of this term (and at least eight common synonyms in Ibn Arabi's technical vocabulary), see Hakim, Miriam, pp. 678-683, plus the entries for the related terms. For Ibn ^?Arabi^?s conception of the role of the Pole (and his Imams) in the spiritual hierarchy, in both its temporal and universal dimensions, see the extensive references in Chodkiewicz, Sceau, eh. VI. In the rest of this chapter (e.g., section II-6, at n. 66) he frequently uses this same expression (’’Imam of the Age”) in an apparently more general reference to other figures fulfilling some of the ”Mahdi^?s” broader spiritual functions in every historical period.

^[xx]The Arabic expression here (literally ”a single foot”) more clearly implies the alternative between two possible kinds of spiritual knowledge—either of God (i.e., the universal, comprehensive divine reality: ”Allah”) or of particular divine Names and their manifestations in the events of this world—that underlies Ibn ^?Arabi^?s discussion here (as already at notes 16-17 above).

^[xxi]III, 331.34-338.2; the short passages not translated are identified within the summaries or notes

^[xxii]See the earlier reference to this hadith at n. 18 above; Ibn ’Arabi assumes that the number of Helpers agrees with the number of years of the Mahdi's mission, and mentions (III, 331.33) the case of a young Sufi friend who was informed in an inspired vision that the number of the Mahdi's Wuzara' would be nine—a figure corresponding to the number of their distinctive spiritual qualities described in the rest of the chapter.

^[xxiii]Or "calling" or "requesting": the Arabic root d-'-w, translated here by forms of "pray," refers not to the obligatory, ritual divine service (salat), but to the individual's personal prayers to God, often—as is clearly the case here—with the added sense of a specific call or request for some particular divine action or response. (We have also kept the subject indefinite, as in the original Arabic, since this condition ultimately applies not only to the Mahdi or his Helpers, but to each wali participating in this spiritual state, as Ibn Arabi states explicitly at n. 29 below.)

^[xxiv]Ibn Arabi's expression here apparently refers to his characteristic understanding that each being's inner strivings or petitions to God (i.e., "prayer" in the broadest possible sense, whether or not consciously and appropriately formulated) necessarily are directed toward one or another specific aspects of the overall divine Reality, expressed in Koranic terms by the many divine Names ("Lord," "King," etc.), that constitute the ontological "lords" of that individual.

^[xxv]ilhah, a term that implies not only urgency and insistence, but also a sort of specific, determined pleading, close to an open demand. Ibn Arabi goes on to explain that this sort of attitude—evidently inappropriate in man's ordinary relationship with God—is apparently permitted the Mahdi as part of the proof of his special, quasi-prophetic function.

^[xxvi]I.e., to realize this otherwise "impossible" request as one of the unique miracles (mu'iizaf) performed by the prophetic messengers that constitute part of the decisive divine "Argument" or "Proof’ (huh a) of their special mission.

^[xxvii]Ibn 'Arabi is alluding here more broadly to his own status as the preeminent "follower of Muhammad" (see references at n. 16-17 above), and by extension to the similar position of all the (fully accomplished) "Muhammadan saints," which he brings out explicitly at the end of this section and in the rest of this chapter (especially II-7 and 9 below). For the deeper grounds of this special status of the saints in relation to the "heritage" of Muhammad (which ultimately encompasses the realities of all the other prophets and messengers), see the extended references in Chodkiewicz, Sceau, ch. IV-V and Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 1191-1201 (entries on "irth"/"warith").

^[xxviii]This hadith was quoted in full among the many traditions concerning the characteristics of the Mahdi cited at the beginning of this chapter (see n. 7 above), and Ibn 'Arabi repeats this phrase whenever the question of'isma (see following note) arises in the following sections (especially II-7 and 9 below).

^[xxix]See the excellent, more complete discussion of Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of 'isma—which is far more profound and universal, in its metaphysical and spiritual dimensions, than the more familiar treatments of this subject in kalam theology (where it is primarily limited to discussion of the prophets and Imams)—in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 806-810. Sections II-7 (n. 78) and II-9 below have a more detailed discussion of this characteristic divine inspiration of the Mahdi/Imam (and the other saints participating in this spiritual condition), in contrast with the fallible personal judgments (ra'v/qiyas) of those who approach the outward forms and traces of revelation without that inner guidance. See also the more detailed discussion of this typical contrast between the saints (as the true 'ulama') and the fuqaha' in the article cited at n. 3 above.

^[xxx]Riial al-ghavb: this Sufi expression refers to saints of high spiritual rank (especially the abdal) or other spiritual beings (angels, etc.) who may receive a divine mission to become invisible or take on human form in another place. As an illustration of this phenomenon, see Ibn 'Arabi's own firsthand account of two personal experiences with such "mysterious strangers," including an unnamed Iranian Sufi master, at the end of this same chapter (summarized in section III, notes 118-120 below).

^[xxxi]Ibn ^?Arabi frequently interprets in this light the many symbols mentioned in the visions of the Prophet (e.g., during his Mi'rak as explained in chapter 367 [III, 340-354], section II of our translation here); one of his favorite illustrations of the phenomena referred to here is the Prophet's recognition of the "milk" offered him by an angel (according to a famous hadith) as a symbol of spiritual knowledge.

Chapter 311 of the Futuhat (III, 41-44; "On the Station of the 'Arisings by Special Designation' [nawashf ikhtisasival from the Unseen") is entirely devoted to these phenomena of "manifestations" or "projections"—both by Sufi saints and by angels, etc.—in various sensible and imaginal forms. Ibn 'Arabi gives a number of fascinating anecdotes concerning such incidents, analyzes their metaphysical underpinnings (in the "Presence" of Imagination, khayal) and discusses the special unerring ability of the Prophet to perceive the spiritual realities (ma'ani) underlying such phenomena. (See the translation by Wm. Chittick elsewhere in this anthology.)

^[xxxii]Ibn 'Arabi's technical vocabulary for describing the many facets of divine "communication" and its human "reception," which combines a profound concern for the subtleties of Koranic expression with close attention to the diverse phenomena of spiritual experience and their complex metaphysical foundations, is so extraordinarily rich that any English equivalents of the key terms can only be very approximate.

Here the divine "address" (al-khitab al-ilahi) or "discourse" is the divine "Speech" (kalam/hadith) specifically as it is directed toward (and received by) a particular person. Its "delivery" or transmission (ilqa': literally "projection") into the heart (or hearing or any other senses) of the person thus addressed may take any of the forms described below—since ultimately (for Ibn 'Arabi, but relying on many passages of the Koran) all Being is nothing but divine "Speech," an insight that is amplified in the immediately following section (II-3, n. 41 below).

For an excellent presentation of these and related technical terms in their broader context in the Shaykh's writings (as well as a helpful reminder of the complexities of their actual Koranic usage), see Hakim, Mu'iarm pp. 400-405 ("al-Khitab al-Ilahi") and 1182-1191 ("al-Wahv al-Ilahi").

^[xxxiii]lbn ^?Arabi understands and employs this key expression (and related forms of the same root) to convey an extremely wide range of meanings, which—as shown by S. al-Hakim in the long study (pp. 1182-1191) cited in the preceding note—closely reflect the broader dimensions and subtleties of Koranic usage. In particular, readers familiar with the usual discussions of wahv (as the uniquely prophetic form of "revelation") in Islamic theological and philosophical literature (as well as in more apologetically oriented Sufi texts) should take note of the very different parameters and intentions of Ibn ^?Arabi^?s complex usage of this term here and elsewhere in his writings. The critical problem of the relation of the wahv of each prophet to that of the saints who are his true "inheritors" (see notes 14 and 25) is clarified in Chapter 14 (On "the Secrets of the Prophets among the Saints..."), O.Y. II, 357-362 (= Cairo ed., I, 149- 152).

^34,ala iihat al-hadith: here the emphasis implied by this term is on both the (relative) novelty of information conveyed and the fact that it is perceived as a message coming from outside the person to whom it is delivered—not so much on the usual meaning of verbal "speaking," since this inspiration is perceived by the heart and not the sense of hearing (again, see detailed explanation in Chapter 14, O.Y. II, 357-360). Here and in the other examples described in this section Ibn Arabi wants to emphasize the specific kind of divine "address" or inspiration in which there is a conscious awareness of this particular message as something clearly "received" or "projected" into the person's awareness from a higher, divine source, not as the product or expression of his personal thinking (nazar) or previous knowledge. This fundamental aspect of genuine "inspiration" is also brought out in the continuation of the Koranic verse opening this section: "And likewise We inspired in you a spirit from Our Command. You did not know what was the Book nor the Faith.... "(Kor. 42:52). The decisive importance of the Heart (qalb: the locus of all spiritual perception; see Hakim, Mu'jam, pp.916-921) as the instrument of this direct inspiration (following the Koranic usage of wayh: see references at n. 30), and thus of its immediate spiritual apprehension without any sensible "veil," becomes clearer only in contrast to the immediately following discussion of the auditory and other "veiled" forms of the divine Speech addressed to particular individuals.

^[xxxv]The "necessary sciences" or forms of knowledge (Tilurn darurivaT used here in the accepted sense of that term in Islamic philosophy and theology, are the abstract universal premises (prior to sense- perception) of all thought (including logic, mathematics, etc.), which therefore underlie all communication and ordinary, non-revealed knowledge; they are innately shared by all human beings and cannot be doubted or questioned, although because of their universality they are not always (or even usually) consciously formulated. For Ibn 'Arabi's own distinctive conception of the "necessary" forms of knowledge, in the broader context of his spiritual epistemology, see chapter 19 (O.Y. ed. Ill, 78-87).

^[xxxvi]Ibn 'Arabi goes on to reiterate that although our awareness of various forms of knowledge within ourselves may often strike us as a new discovery, it does not ordinarily share the other essential characteristics of this particular form of divine inspiration—i.e., it is not perceived by the heart as a divine "speech” "delivered” to us from a higher source outside ourselves.

^37,ayn taialli al-Haqq: i.e., the theophany or Self-manifestation of the ultimate divine Reality or absolutely Real (al-Haqq). This ambiguous status of all phenomena, which can be either "veils” or "theophanies” depending on the inner state of the person experiencing them, is one of the central themes of all of Ibn 'Arabi's writing: it is frequently expressed, for example, in his typical ontological (and etymological) understanding of kufr, kafara, etc.—usually translated as "unbelief’—as "covering up” or "veiling” the infinite Signs of God's presence. It is also strikingly illustrated in his famous remarks concerning the differences in men's "vision” of Paradise, e.g. at the end of the chapter on Ismail (I, 94; 109-110 in Austen tr.) in the Fusus: ."..for the matter is one, but in the [same] theophany there is an opposition between the two of them [i.e., the awareness of the man of faith and that of the unbeliever].” For further references, see Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 265-269 ("theophany,” etc.) and 313-318 ("veil,” etc.).

^[xxxviii]This "particular,” individual modality of the divine Speech (Kalam Allah) here is illustrated by Ibn Arabi with the citation of three Koranic verses (9:6, 19:52, 27:8) among those where God is referred to as speaking directly and openly to particular individuals (especially to Moses3'Kalim Allah”). Again (as at notes 30-34 above) he is stressing the essential phenomenological distinction between this kind of

specific, individual divine "address” and the more universal manifestations of the divine Speech. (See the detailed references in Hakim, Mu'jam, at notes 32-33 above.)

^[xxxix]It is important to note that Ibn 'Arabi clearly sees all of these forms of revelation or inspiration as applying to the case of the Prophet and the Mahdi's "Helpers,” and by extension to all those saints or inspired "knowers” who share in this particular spiritual station (mag am), and that he is not using these distinctions to justify a particular theological "ranking” of prophets (or of prophets and saints). Instead, this concluding allusion points the discerning reader toward the more essential problem of developing his own awareness and understanding of that "divine address” (in all its dimensions) that is "delivered” personally to him. See again the more detailed treatment of these questions in Chapter 14 of the Futuhat, O.Y. ed. II, 357-362 (= Cairo ed. I, 150).

^[xl]Perhaps the most pertinent illustration in Ibn 'Arabi's own writing of this sort of "translation” (tariama) of a divine inspiration—in this case received from the hand of the Prophet—into human language is his famous book Fusus al-Hikam, where, in his Prologue, he explicitly sets forth his claim (or wish) to be the Prophet's faithful "translator” (mutariim). Note that this form of divine inspiration is clearly differentiated here from the direct angelic "dictation” of the actual words of the revealed Book described in the immediately preceding passage, which evidently constitutes one of the unique attributes of the Koran.

Ultimately, for Ibn 'Arabi, every form of knowledge is based on divine "inspirations” and individual "theophanies,” although most often those relying on their own reasoning and inquiry (nazar) are unaware of this or take it for granted: see, e.g., Futuhat, chapter 19, O.Y. ed. Ill, 81-82.

^[xli]mutariim: though the phrase may sound strange in English (and even in the original Arabic), since we would more naturally expect to see the world referred to as a "translation” of the divine Speech, it expresses in a simple formula the very essence of Ibn ^?Arabi^?s central insight into the theophanic, continually recreated nature of all Being and the transcendent, paradoxical unity of the "subject” and "object” of that Whole as it unfolds in the realized vision of the "people of unveiling” (ahl al-kashfh the Heart of the "Perfect Man.”

^[xlii]”Holders of authority” translates ulu' al-'amr, an allusion to the famous Koranic command (4:59)

."..Obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority among you..... ” which has been

the source of endless controversy over who are actually the true "authorities” of the Community since the time of the Prophet. However in this section Ibn ^?Arabi uses the term as a relatively uncontroversial reference to the various types of judges required to apply the provisions of the divine Law. The "ranks” here, as explained in an untranslated part of this passage, refer to three basic fields of jurisdiction of the religious Law (offenses or disputes involving physical harm, honor or property), and not to specific governmental or administrative posts.

^43,ulama' al-rusum: here this term (used more broadly in the previous section) refers to the formal "knowledge” of the external "traces” of the Prophetic heritage typical of the mass of legal scholars (fuqaha'I popularly known as the "learned” ('ulama'T The roots of Ibn 'Arabi's radically differing point of view—which at first seems to contradict his own discussion here of individuals whose formal legal "knowledge” is overcome by their passions—are explained more openly throughout sections II-7 (e.g., at n. 43) and II-9 below.

It should be stressed that this term, for Ibn 'Arabi, is primarily used in a "descriptive” and not necessarily pejorative sense, since many of the saints and Sufis (including, for example, the pious judge described in section II-5 below) were also notable representatives of this category of 'ulama'. See his discussion of the complementary functions of "those who preserve (the outward literal) forms of the divine judgment” as expressed by the prophet (hafazat al-ahkam) and "those who preserve (the Prophet's spiritual) states and secrets” (hafazat al-ahwal wa-l-asrar) in Chapter 14, O.Y. II, 361-362 (= Cairo ed., I, 151), and the more detailed discussions and references in our article cited at n. 3 above.

^[xliv]A quotation from the classical hadith account of the characteristics of the Mahdi given at the opening of this chapter (section I, at n. 7 above).

^[xlv]I.e, Ibn 'Arabi is not specifically pointing to some outwardly "reformable” defect in the teaching and transmission of the Law in his time, nor to the fraudulent pretensions or moral defects of particular individuals (although that latter subject does come up in section II-7 below). Rather he is primarily alluding here (and more clearly in the following sections) to the fundamental—and in our present circumstances, humanly inescapable—problem that the just, appropriate application and interpretation of the traditional sources concerning the divine commands and their historical application by the Prophet usually require a far deeper understanding of both their ultimate contexts and intentions and the relevant factors in each particular case than can be expected of any but the rarest individuals, those whose every action is divinely inspired and protected from error (ma'sum: see the discussion at n. 27 above). As he remarks more openly in section II-7 below, those truly qualified "authorities” (the true wulat) in any age, whether or not they outwardly rule, are none other than the divinely guided "saints”—i.e., the awliya' (a term drawn from the same Arabic root as the words translated as "authority” in these passages, and having explicit connotations of spiritual authority rwilaval that are not readily conveyed by the term "saint” in Western languages).

^[xlvi]l.e., what Ibn 'Arabi calls their "passion" (shahwa), referring to all the various ways in which their personal emotions may run contrary to their knowledge of the legally correct judgment (see the illustrations in the following section). The person exhibiting this moral capacity of rational self-control is called "judicious" Caqil), an expression which Ibn 'Arabi derives from the root sense of "binding" or "hindering" (one's personal emotions, in this case); see the application of this term to the prophets in particular at n. 53 below.

^[xlvii]This Koranic verse and the equally famous "divine saying" (hadith qudsi) quoted here ("My Mercy preceded My Anger") are of course among the key leitmotifs of Ibn 'Arabi's thought: see references in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 521-529 and many other citations in this anthology. The brief passages not translated here are simply elaborations and reminders of this fundamental principle that "God's Anger (eventually) ends for those with whom He is angry (Kor. 1:7, etc.), while God's Mercy is never ending." (For the sake of consistency, we have followed the customary translation of the Koranic term ghadab as "anger," although that rendering implies all sorts of anthropomorphic associations considerably removed from the deeper meaning of that expression in the thought of Ibn 'Arabi—and probably in the Koran itself Similarly, the English word "love"—especially given its connotations in the Bible—probably comes much closer than "mercy" or "compassion" to expressing the full range of realities implied in Ibn 'Arabi's notion of rahma.)

^[xlviii]hudud Allah, a Koranic concept which originally includes both the divine "statutes" and prescriptions (ahkam: see n. 94)—which can of course be understood in a more spiritual and universal as well as a more exoteric and legalistic sense—and the earthly punishments and penalties applied for offenses against them in the various historical systems of Islamic Law. (The same term [ahhadd] is translated as "penalty" when used in that explicitly legal context in the following paragraph.)

^[xlix]I.e., to the one who has realized within himself the fundamental justice of the divine Command and has carried out the process of inner repentance and recourse to God's Mercy that has spiritually "purified" him and enabled him to avoid the further consequences of his sin (in this world or the next). Ibn 'Arabi goes on to make clear that his point here actually applies to the inner spiritual situation of every individual with regard to the infinite range of the divine "commands" or "limits" more generally understood (see preceding note), not just those infractions that happen to involve "criminal" actions and the external forms of the law.

^5Qal-hakim: although translated throughout as "judge" (in the more familiar legal sense), this term can also be understood in an extended (and more exact) sense as anyone who seeks to ascertain and apply the divine "judgment" or "commandment" (hukm) appropriate to a given action or situation—a grave and almost impossible responsibility if viewed from the broader spiritual perspective that Ibn 'Arabi gradually

unfolds here and in the following sections. See also n. 94 before for the multiple meanings of hukm ("judgment," "command," etc.) and its verbal forms throughout this chapter.

^[li]Ibn 'Arabi's conception of the unique qualifications of the accomplished saints (awliya') in this regard is developed in greater detail in sections 7 and 9 below; but at the very end of this chapter (section III, notes 119-122 below) he places severe restrictions on the situations in which they should even attempt to argue with others on the basis of their revealed insights—i.e., only when they actually receive a divine order to do so. These and many other essential qualifications involved in Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of the "spiritual authority" (wilava) of the saints are discussed in much greater detail in our article "Ibn 'Arabi's 'Esotericism': the Problem of Spiritual Authority," cited at n. 3 above.

A revealing illustration of the complex responsibilities involved in the position of human, worldly judgeship is Ibn 'Arabi's remark at this point (III, 334.13) that "In my opinion none of the questions concerning the religiously prescribed legal judgments is more difficult than zina' (i.e., adultery and other forbidden sexual relations) in particular; even if the punishment is carried out, after that there still remain other claims (against those responsible) on the part of the persons injured."

^[lii]An allusion to the many Koranic verses insisting that "the Messenger is only responsible for the clear communication Jbalagh]" (Kor. 24:54; 29:18; etc.) of God's Word, not for the particular reactions of his listeners—which are discussed in the many other verses alluded to here stressing God's role (and their individual responsibilities) in those reactions. The related and practically crucial question of the limited degree to which the inspired saint should attempt to convince others (by argument) of the insights he has realized at this stage is discussed in the final section translated from this chapter (notes 121-122 below).

^[liii]a’qal al-nass (which could also be "the most intelligent of men"), translated here in accordance with Ibn 'Arabi's earlier discussion (n. 46 above) of the ’aqil, in this ethical and juridical context, as the person whose (spiritual) knowledge is in full control of his passions. Clearly the degree of that virtue ideally required here—to the extent of refraining from judging others (even inwardly), based on a full recognition of the inner necessity of their actions—could be expected only of the prophets and the most accomplished saints.

For Ibn ^?Arabi^?s understanding of the "prophets" (anbiya’) in general as a group far larger than the small number of "messengers" specifically charged with communicating a specific divine legislation (i.e., a rasul or sharp—and his related understanding of the saints (awliyrf) as the anbiya’ of the Muslim Community—, see the many references in Chodkiewicz, Sceau, ch. Ill; Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 1058-1053; and chapter 14 of the Futuhat O.Y. II, pp. 356 ff.

^[liv]The "sublime knowledge" referred to here appears to be the divine inspiration of the appropriate "judgment" (hukm) that, as Ibn ^?Arabi goes on to explain (in section 7 below), is shared with the prophets by the "people of unveiling" or awliyff; but it may also refer more specifically here to the prophet’s awareness of the inner states of those whom God has made insensitive to the prophetic message, as discussed in the immediately preceding paragraphs. As noted above (n. 45) the term used for "having authority" here (wali) is etymologically very close to the Arabic expression usually translated as "saint" (wall), no doubt alluding to Ibn ’Arabi’s understanding of the truly inspired "authorities" developed more openly in sections 7 and 9 below.

^[lv]The notion of rizq, for Ibn ’Arabi (closely following the Koran), ultimately extends to all the physical and metaphysical forms of divine "sustenance" or "nourishment" by which the world and its creatures are given life and being: see the discussion of his usage of this and related terms in Hakim, Mu’iam, pp. 531-534. Thus—as in his initial enumeration of the qualities of the Helpers earlier in this

chapter—he commonly distinguishes between the spiritual or noetic (ma'nawiya/ma'qula) forms of this sustenance, which are discussed at the beginning of this section, and the material blessings that are discussed in the second half (6-b below).

^[lvi]Here Ibn 'Arabi is emphasizing the considerable limits on the realm directly "subject" to the temporal functions of the Mahdi. The Arabic term nufus (translated here as "souls") refers specifically in this context only to that very limited aspect of the individual's "soul" which controls his physical body in this "mortal human" (bashari) world, not to the infinitely wider dimensions of the "spirit" (mh) which ultimately constitutes man as insan.

^[lvii]Or simply "themselves" (anfusihim). This final qualification alludes to the insistence throughout Islamic tradition (including the schools of law) on the existence of both disbelieving and believing individuals among the jinn, the latter being followers of one or another of the human prophetic Messengers: see the references to Ibn 'Arabi's discussions of the "jinn"—a term he uses elsewhere in several other, different senses—in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 279-281.

^[lviii]I.e., the spiritual beings who were created from "light," just as the jinn (according to Islamic tradition) were created from the physical element of "fire."

^[lix]This group of angels (al-sa'ihun), who "travel around the roads (turnq) seeking out the people of dhikr," are mentioned in a long hadith—cited in the Sahih of both Bukhari and Muslim, as well as in the Musnad of Ahmad ibn Hanbal—that Ibn 'Arabi included as number 84 in his personal collection of hadith qudsi, the Mishkat al-Anwar (= p. 110 in the French translation, with facing Arabic text, by M. Valsan, La Niche des Lumieres, Paris, 1983.) The passages included in quotation marks here are an approximate quotation from that hadith. These "travelers" are mentioned again at the end of this chapter in a strange story concerning the "men of the Unseen" (rijal al-ghavb: see n. 30 above), summarized at n. 120 below.

^[lx]I.e., as he explains later in this sentence, the dhakirun (who "recall" its true spiritual reality: see n. 17 above), not necessarily all those who are merely reciting the words (talm). The reference here to "sessions" (maialis) of dhikr seems to imply specifically Sufi gatherings; this is clearly the case with in his reference to these "travelers" in the anecdote summarized at the end of this chapter (n. 120 below). For Ibn 'Arabi's own personal preference, in that practical spiritual context, for dhikr of the Koran as opposed to the other (primarily musical) forms of dhikr popular in Sufi circles, see chapter 182 of the Futuhat "Concerning Knowledge of the Station of Sama' and Its Secrets," II, 366-368.

^[lxi]Ayat: i.e., the verses of the Koran.

^[lxii]We have not been able to locate any further biographical details concerning this particular group of disciples and Ibn 'Arabi's role as shaykh during this period, or the reasons for their "loss."

^[lxiii]bathth al-'ilm: the term implies the unfolding or opening up of what was concealed—apparently in reference to Ibn 'Arabi's increasing literary production (and his provision of many of his works with an iiaza 'amma, a "general permission" for their reading and propagation), pedagogical activities which may have coincided with his growing realization of his unique personal role as "Seal of the Muhammadan Saints" (see n. 16 above).

^[lxiv]See Ibn 'Arabi's earlier statement (section I, at n. 17) that "he (i.e., as the 'Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood') and the Qur'an are brothers," along with the references there concerning his distinctive personal understanding of what is meant by that term ("al-Our'an"). Ibn ’Arabi's decisive personal realization of the inner Reality of the Qur'an and the comprehensive spiritual "Station of Muhammad"is

described in detail in his Kitab al-Isra' (= Rasa'il Ibn 'Arabi, ed. Hyderabad, 1948, I, no. 13, pp. 1-92), written in Fez in 594, i.e., roughly the period alluded to here. See the translation and commentary of a key passage from the K. al-Isra' in our two-part article on "The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn 'Arabi and the

Mi'raj" in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 10., no [COMPLETE REFERENCE] The

same experiential realization is more briefly described as the culminating stage of his own spiritual Ascension in chapter 367 of the Futuhat (III, 340-354), section IV-I in the translation here.

^[lxv]The usage of the first person plural here—unlike the case with the preceding sentences, where it may be only a polite form of "I"—appears to be a clear allusion to Ibn 'Arabi's self-conception of his particular role, within the Muslim Community, as the "Seal of the Muhammadan saints" (see n. 16 above) responsible for the ongoing spiritual guidance of the entire Community. Likewise, just as the Seal reflects the total Reality of Muhammad (who at that cosmic level is the "Qur'an," for Ibn 'Arabi), so the expression "I was given the keys of Its understanding" echoes a fundamental hadith of the Prophet cited repeatedly throughout the Shaykh's writings: "I was given the totality of the (divine) Words" (iawami' al- kilam).

^[lxvi]The "intermediaries" (wasa'it), in this immediate context (and judging from the earlier analysis of the divine "discourse," in section II-2 above), appear to be all the "veils" of the particular "forms" (whether angelic or human prophetic messengers, or perhaps the infinite variety of theophanies in general), through which the divine "inspiration" is more often perceived. (But elsewhere in the Futuhat Ibn 'Arabi applies this term more specifically to all the learned transmitters of the the external forms and traces of the prophetic heritage; see chapter 14, O.Y. II, 358: ."..the intermediaries—I mean the fuqaha' and the 'ulama' al-rusum.")

^[lxvii]An important reminder—underlying Ibn ^?Arabi^?s understanding of the proper relations between the "guardians of the (divine) commandments" and the "guardians of the (spiritual) states" (see n. 43 above)—of the fundamental fact that mere access to the external forms of a prophet's speech and activity, no matter how perfect and exact, is not the decisive (or sufficient) factor in understanding their meaning and intentions. See the further extensive discussions of this question in the article cited at n. 3 above.

^[lxviii]1 mam al-Waqt: i.e., the "Pole" (qutb) or "Lord of the Age," etc. For the different meanings of this term (and at least eight other common synonyms in Ibn 'Arabi's technical vocabulary),see Hakim, Miriam, pp. 678-7=683 and Chodkiewicz, Sceau, chapter VI. It is significant that instead of referring to the "Mahdi" here, Ibn 'Arabi uses this ambiguous expression three times (and other forms of "Imam" four additional times) in the space of this relatively short section (III, 335.2-17), clearly implying that this responsibility for the just apportionment of the world's material goods is in some sense a perennial spiritual function. The potential political sensitivity of this expression in his own historical context is suggested by the fate of several prominent Andalusian and Maghrebi Sufis (see n.108 below) who were at least accused of claiming the "Imamate" in a more overtly political sense.

Ibn 'Arabi does not otherwise suggest that this sort of divine inspiration is different in kind from that discussed in the preceding and following sections, where he is clearly referring to the awliva' more generally. He thereby seems to imply that the proper, fully adequate approach to this world's material goods—at least from a comprehensive, spiritual point of view—ultimately requires the same kind of inspired guidance, even if once again that can only be practically realized by a few rare individuals.

^[lxix]baqiyat Allah: a reference to the verse 11:86, "What God has left is better for you all, if you

are among the faithful.... " Much of this section stresses the extreme relativity of our judgments

concerning the individual "possession" (mulk) of what is actually God's and for which we are at best only temporary stewards or custodians in this world.

^7Qtadakhul al-umur: i.e., the interweaving of the spiritual and noetic (ma'nawi) realities and intentions that pervade all things, especially as they are manifested in the events and actions involving particular individuals. Ibn 'Arabi alludes here only briefly to this vast theme—or rather, integral

perspective on the nature of all reality—that can be illustrated in virtually every area of his thought: see, e.g., the references to nikah ma'nawi in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 1069-1071.

Although his discussions of this notion elsewhere often concern its more abstract metaphysical dimensions (e.g., the various noetic and spiritual principles involved in his schemas of cosmology and cosmogony), here it is focused on the concrete, practical recognition of those spiritual realities underlying the specific "judgments" rendered by the Mahdi (and the awliva' who possess the same inspired insight), a recognition made possible by their infallible "penetrating vision" (the spiritual quality discussed at II-1 above). This point was already clearly illustrated in Ibn ^?Arabi^?s earlier discussion of the difficulties of realizing and applying the divine norms while simultaneously taking into account their mundane and ultimate spiritual dimensions (section II-5 above).

^[lxxi]al-sanaT al-'amaliya wa-l-'ilmiya: this formula—which appears to have been adopted (directly or indirectly) from the Rasa'il of the Ikhwan al-Safa^?—apparently includes all human creative activities in this world, including the all-encompassing role of the divinely inspired ruler, symbolized here by the Mahdi/Imam.

^[lxxii]а1-^?адП: i.e., the person whose reason and knowledge restrain the demands of his passions, as explained at nn. 46 and 53 above.

^[lxxiii]See Ibn Arabi’s discussion of the various modalities of this delivery or "projection" (ilqa^) of the divine Speech "addressed" to the prophets and saints in sections II-2 and 3 (nn. 33-41) above.

^[lxxiv]nikah ma'nawi: i.e., of the divine Source and its human receptacle, and more broadly, of all the spiritual, noetic realities and principles manifested in each "material" event: see the references to this vast theme in n. 70.

^[lxxv]"textual indications" = nusus, a term which evidently refers in this context to the outward, literal form of the scriptures and hadith collections—or rather to the specific divine "stipulations" which they are usually understood to contain. Together, such materials form the ostensible basis for the system of analogies or inferences—in fact based on certain influential jurists' reasoned suppositions concerning the presumed purposes underlying the various indications in those records—that constitute the various schools of Islamic law (fiqh). The roots of Ibn 'Arabi's fundamental criticism of the common practice of qiyas (legal inference based on "analogy" or "analogical reasoning")—as opposed to the infallible divine inspiration characterizing the Mahdi and saints having reached this spiritual station—are detailed in section II-9 (nn. 96-105) below.

The key issues of the conditions for a true understanding of the original intentions and meaning of hadith—which are the sine qua non of any truly "living" transmission of knowledge—raised in the rest of this section and in II-9 below are beautifully summarized in the conclusion of chapter 29 (I, 198; O.Y. ed. Ill, 240-242), concerning the true "Ahl al-Bavt." (See also the full-scale study of Ibn 'Arabi's own understanding of these questions in the article cited at n. 3 above.)

^[lxxvi]al-shar' al-haqiqi al-muhammadi: the key term shar'—which we have generally left in transliterated form in the following pages—is ordinarily understood simply as the religious "Law" (the Sharia) or what was "prescribed" by the Prophet (and ultimately by God) as guidance for human action. Here Ibn 'Arabi, as is often his practice, alludes to the original meaning of that Arabic root as the "opening" or establishment of the authentic "path to water" (i.e., the water of Life)—a sense which does not necessarily contradict the popular usage, but does set it in a larger, potentially transforming perspective. (See also n. 106 below, and especially the references at notes 2 and 3 above on the related term "Sharfa.")

^[lxxvii]aLnusus, as at n. 75 above; Ibn 'Arabi again (as at n. 45 above) stresses that he is not questioning the validity and necessity of the traditionally transmitted forms of earlier revelation as such, but rather the spirit and methods that are frequently applied (by no means only in "legal" situations) to rediscover and realize their more profound truth and actual perennial intentions.

^[lxxviii]Ibn 'Arabi's conception of hsma, divinely assured "immunity from error" (in one's spiritual judgment and perception), as an essential concomitant of the divine inspiration of the saints as well as of the prophetic Messengers was already developed in section II-1 above (see references at n. 29). The Mahdi's inspired condition of 'isma—in contrast with the very fallible ra'v and qiyas of the ordinary jurists—is again repeatedly emphasized in section II-9 below.

^[lxxix]al-faqir al-sadiq: although the term faqir (literally, one who is "poor" in relation to God, i.e., the perfect "servant") has often been a vague (and sometimes pejorative) popular synonym for "Sufi" in the broadest sense, here it is used quite specifically to indicate the rare spiritual state of pure openness and receptivity allowing the saint who is inwardly "sincere" to receive the inspiration transmitted originally to the prophet-Messenger he faithfully "follows" (see the essential references at n. 27 above). A clearer sense of the deep-rooted psychic obstacles to this state may be gathered from Ibn 'Arabi's enumeration of the inner motives of those "learned in the outward forms (of religion)" in the following paragraph.

For the "Helpers'" (and saints') related condition of sidq—"truth-telling" in the rare spiritual sense of absolute inner "sincerity" regarding one's inner relation to God—and its "divinely supported" consequences (nasr), see the opening section at nn. 11-13 above.

^8Qashab 'ilm al-rusum: see the further discussions of these 'ulama al-rusum in sections II-3, II-4 (n. 43) and II-9 below.

^[lxxxi]The term could refer simply to Muslims in general, but more commonly in Ibn 'Arabi and other Sufi writers (following indications in the Koran and hadith) it refers quite specifically to the accomplished awliya' and prophets. The impassioned tone of this passage—combined with what we know of the martyrdom or persecution of many prominent Andalusian and Maghrebi Sufis of the time (Ibn Qasi, Ibn Barrajan and Ibn al-'Arif)—strongly suggest that the latter sense is indeed intended here. The cases of these famous saints who were intimately involved with certain political events of their time (and some of whom may well have claimed the role of "Imam" in a more openly political sense), also indicate that Ibn 'Arabi's discussions of divine governance in this chapter are probably not purely academic: see the historical references concerning the three above-mentioned Andalusian Sufis in the corresponding articles (by A. Faure) in the El², vol. III.

^[lxxxii]Although they may well outwardly succeed, Ibn 'Arabi implies, with regard to the things they prize in this world. The full Koranic verses alluded to in this sentence are especially important in understanding the critique of the fuqaha' that follows: "And do not say, regarding what your tongues describe (as divinely forbidden or commanded) the lie (that) This is licit, and that is illicit*, so that you make up lies against God. Surely those who make up lies against God do not prosper" (the last phrase is repeated at verse 10:69). Ibn 'Arabi may also be alluding to verses 6:20-21, with their implicit contrast of the two approaches in question here: "Those to whom we have brought the Book recognize it as they recognize their own sons, (but) those who have lost their souls do not have faith. And who does more wrong than than whoever makes up a lie about God and calls His Signs a lie? Surely those who do do wrong shall not prosper." Again, see the full discussion of these critiques in the article cited at n. 3 above.

^[lxxxiii]"Recollection" or remembrance (of God): the continuous invocation (whether silent or virtually inaudible) of certain prayer formulae or divine Names throughout the day's activities, often with the accompaniment of the tasbih (prayer beads), a practice frequently—though by no means exclusively—associated with adherence to a particular Sufi order; see the allusions in n. 59 above. Ibn 'Arabi's criticism of this group's hypocritical pretense of Sufism already foreshadows the following Koranic allusion (to verses 3:77-78, in n. 84).

^[lxxxiv]Again the full Koranic verse is directly applicable to this psycho-spiritual "type" in a sense which clearly brings out Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of the immediate "contemporary" dimensions of the "Last Day": "Surely those who buy a thing of little value with God's covenant and their faith, those people have no share in the next world, and God does not speak to them nor does He look at them on the Day of the Rising, and He does not purify them [or: 'cause them to increase'!, and theirs is an

excruciating torment. And there is a group of them who twist the Book with their tongues, so that you might consider that (what they say) is from the Book, although it is not from the Book. And they say that (what they say) is from God, although it is not from God—and they say lies against God while they know (what they are doing).” See the following note for the full hadith to which Ibn Arabi alludes at the beginning of this sentence.

^[lxxxv]The phrases in quotes here and in the sentence preceding the previous note are taken from the following saying of the Prophet recorded by Tirmidhi (from Abu Hurayra) and selected by Ibn Arabi in his personal collection of hadith qudsh the Mishkat al-Anwar (no. 35; pp. 64-65 in the translation by M. Valsan): ”At the end of time men will appear who will dupe the world with (the pretense of) religion: they will dress up for the people in the skins of gentle sheep and their tongues will be sweeter than honey, but their hearts are the hearts of wolves. God will say: Are they completely deluded about me, or do they openly dare (to affront) me?! I swear by Myself that I shall surely send those men a trial (or torment: fitna) that will leave even the calmest of them completely dismayed.'”

^[lxxxvi]The last phrase, evoking the Koranic references to the fate of the "wrongdoers” (шщпшип), is an allusion to Ibn 'Arabi's assumption that the people of Gehenna nonetheless do take a certain pleasure in precisely those things which—in distracting them from God—ultimately help constitute their punishment; see, for example, the famous verses at the end of the chapter on Ismail in the Fusus al-Hikam (I, 94; Bezels, pp. 109-110), and the longer discussions in the eschatological section of this anthology.

^[lxxxvii]The vast extent of these bloody internecine conflicts between these and other legal and theological schools serving as rallying points for a wide variety of ethnic and social loyalties—and fueling civil wars, riots and repeated massacres which over more than a century effectively destroyed, even before the Mongol conquests, important parts of the major Persian cities of Nishapur, Rayy and Isfahan—are surveyed in W. Madelung's (too modestly titled) article "The Spread of Maturidism and the Turks,” pp. 109-169 in his Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London, 1985); Madelung also traces the spread of these violent ’’legal” conflicts to the Ayyubid realms where Ibn 'Arabi spent much of the latter part of his life. The particularly dramatic role of this Hanafi-Shaft'i conflict (frequently cited by al-Ghazali) in the century-long self-destruction of Nishapur—strikingly similar to that of modern- day Beirut—is detailed in R. Bulliet's The Patricians of Nishabur, (Cambridge, 1972).

^[lxxxviii]I.e., the ’’imams” or founders of their particular legal schools (Shafi'i, Malik, etc.), as already at n. 9 above. In the long chapter 69 of the Futuhat on ritual prayer (I, 386-546), Ibn 'Arabi, stressing the diversity of the evidence of hadith on particular details of religious practice, repeatedly criticizes the fuqaha’ of his day for hypocritically and arrogantly denying iitihad while simultaneously insisting that everyone else follow only their own legal school. See, e.g., his ironic remark at I, 494: "So the first (person) to deny them on the Day of Resurrection will be their (own) Imam! For Ibn 'Arabi, in contrast (at I, 392), the perennial obligation of iitihad for all believers (with the necessary qualifications to interpret the Koran and hadith) follows from the divine injunction: "And strive (iahidu) for God with the striving due to Him. He picked you out and did not place any constriction (harai) upon you in Religion....” (Kor. 22:73).

See especially the more complete explanation of these questions and Ibn 'Arabi's distinctive understanding of these religio-legal problems in our article cited at n. 3 above.

I.e., the state of "pure servanthood" t’ubudiva) characterizing Ibn ^?Arabi^?s typical conception of spiritual superiority of the afrad (also termed al-malamiya, the "people of blame," etc.)—whose spiritual rank is often ’’invisible" to the outside world and whose lives frequently exhibit this same characteristic of extraordinary devotion to their ’’ordinary” responsibilities—as embodying the very summit of the spiritual path. The repeated references in this chapter to Khadir (one of the archetypal representatives of the afrad, for Ibn ’Arabi) point in the same direction. See the references from other chapters of the Futuhat to this "ultimate stage of walaya," which is one of the recurrent themes of his religious thought, in Chodkiewicz, Sceau. ch. VII (pp. 133-143).

^[xc]Ibn 'Arabi emphasizes the broader metaphysical significance of this story, that God becomes manifest (whether or not we are aware of it) in the form of man's desire, virtually every time he deals with the figure of Moses: see, e.g., the end of the chapter on Moses (no. 25) in the Fusus al-Hikam (= Affifi ed., I, 212-213), the beginning of the concluding chapter on Muhammad, and especially Ibn 'Arabi's own encounter with Moses during his autobiographical spiritual Ascension in chapter 367 of the Futuhat (III, 439-440), section IV-G of our translation and commentary here.

^[xci]Ibn 'Arabi illustrates this point (concerning the "external Imams," those with a visible, public role in this world) with a brief story about the extreme conscientiousness of the 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in regard to his public responsibilities.

^[xcii]Here Ibn Arabi mentions Khadir's "original,” genealogical name (going back to Noah), as given by Islamic tradition: see the article ”al-Khadir” by Wensinck, summarizing the historical sources, in EI2, vol. IV. The story of Khadir's discovery of the fountain of Life is apparently taken from the popular literature of the "Tales of the Prophets" (qisas al-anbiva'L rather than from the hadith.

For the broader role of Khadir in Ibn ^?Arabi^?s thought (building on an extensive pre-existing body of Sufi tradition), see his description of his personal encounters with Khadir on three separate occasions in chapter 25 (I, 186-188; O.Y. ed. Ill, pp. 180-185); the numerous references in Chodkiewicz, Sceau, Index s.v.; and the chapter focusing more specifically on Khadir's initiatic function in H. Corbin,

L'imagination creatrice..., pp. 43-54.

^[xciii]Here Ibn Arabi interrupts this story with a long aside (III, 336.32-337.5) describing his first personal encounter with Khadir, in the person of a stranger (during his youth in Seville) "who taught me to surrender to the spiritual masters and not to dispute with them (even when they are wrong)"; it was Ibn 'Arabi's master at the time (one Abu al-Abbas al-^?Uraybi) who subsequently identified that mysterious individual as being Khadir. This anecdote itself (summarized in H. Corbin, L'imagination creatrice..., p. 51) is translated in the biographical study at the beginning of Asin Palacios' L'Islam christianise (French translation, Paris, 1983), p.36. Another longer version of the same story—along with descriptions of Ibn 'Arabi's subsequent meetings with Khadir—is given in chapter 25 (I, 186-188; O.Y. ed. Ill, pp. 180-182), where it is also implied that the subject of this dispute was the identity or name of the Mahdi (and that Khadir confirmed the validity of Ibn Arabi's own vision in that regard).

For "water" as one of Ibn 'Arabi's primary symbols—based on passages in the Koran and several key hadith—for the "throne of divine Life" flowing through all things, see chapter 317 (III, 65-66) and further extensive references in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 1071-1077.

^[xciv]It is not entirely clear whether the pronoun here refers to the "Imams" discussed earlier in the chapter; to "those who have faith in God and the Last Day" (from the immediately preceding Koranic verse [58:22] not translated here); or—what is most probable, and could include the previous two categories—to the accomplished saints (awliya'f in general. This description again seems to allude to Ibn 'Arabi's conception of the afrad or malamiya. the largely unrecognized "true servants of God" who represent the highest stage of sainthood (see references at note 89 above).

^[xcv]sha'n suggests an activity or occupation as well as a general state or condition. For Ibn Arabi, this verse is usually taken in reference to the universal process of "theophany" (tajalliyat) through which the world (i.e., the "other-than-God") is continuously re-created and made manifest: see the references in Hakim, Mftjam, pp. 639-643 ("al-sha'n al-'ilahi").

^[xcvi]See already section II-1 (at notes 23-29) above on the special efficacity of the Mahdi's prayers, corresponding to his quasi-prophetic function.

^[xcvii]nazila, usually translated here as "event," could equally be translated, in this legal context, as "case"—i.e., in the broad sense of a unique "event" subject to a particular judgment, not necessarily as a generalizable legal type or precedent (=qadiya. also translated as "case" below).

As in earlier sections, hukm is usually translated here as "judgment" (and its verbal forms accordingly), although the actual meaning tends to vary in emphasis, according to the context, between the following: (a) the timeless divine "commandment" or "standard"; (b) the particular inner aspect of the "case" or circumstance to which that standard actually applies; (c) the human religio-legal "statute," "rule" or precept (supposedly corresponding to the first two meanings); (d) the actual act of applying these standards to particular circumstances (whether or not in an explicitly legal context); and (e) the resulting "verdict" or conclusion. In other, earlier contexts (corresponding partially to meanings "d" or "e" here), hukm has instead been translated as "influence."

^[xcviii]mubah: i.e., what is "permitted" in the sense of what is neither explicitly illicit (haram) nor positively prescribed by the divine Law (shar'/shari'a: see notes 2-3, 76 and 106). The usual translation of this term as "indifferent," while appropriate for its traditional legal usage as a category in Islamic law, fails to convey the positive and much wider "ontological" perception Ibn 'Arabi is pointing to here. Historically speaking—and this is the ground of Ibn 'Arabi's vehement protests in this chapter (see notes 8- 9, 80-87 and the rest of this section) and in many other places—virtually all the schools of Islamic law (both Sunni and Shiite) used some schema of "analogies" (in the sense described here) to set up complex systems of graded categories of "preference" or "prohibition" (or "purity" and "impurity") extending, at least in theory, to virtually every imaginable human action. The extremely limited meaning of "mubah" in that legalistic context—where it at best implies at best a "neutral" value and implicitly a rather dubious religious status in relation to the extensive "positive" categories—is therefore substantially different from what Ibn 'Arabi actually intends by that term here. For his own distinctively positive and more comprehensive usage, see notes 99-102 below and especially the translations at the beginning of section III below, as well as the more complete discussion and references in our article cited at n. 3 above.

^[xcix]Din-Allah: this is only one of several related Koranic expressions—e.g., al-Din and al-Din al-Khalis (Kor. 39:3), "the Pure Religion," both used in a similar sense in the opening sentences of this chapter (n. 8 above)—referring to the eternal, divine Reality that is the Source of the prophets' message, in contrast to the many religions of men. In a certain sense, all of Ibn 'Arabi's works constitute a sort of extended commentary on this distinction: see the extensive references and careful analysis of these key terms in Hakim, Mu'jam, pp. 475-483, and especially Ibn 'Arabi's moving description of his own decisive realization of this fundamental insight in the following chapter 367 (III, 350; section IV-I of our

translation here) and in his K. al-Isra' (see the translation and commentary in our article cited at n. 98 above.).

^[c]The technical terms here are taken from the traditional discipline of usul al-fiqh ("principles of jurisprudence": see the articles "usul" in SET and "fiqh" in EI2) which, from the third century (A.H) onward, gradually elaborated the theoretical rationales underlying the practice of the earlier Islamic jurists ffuqaha'). In the practice of qivas—upon which most of the influential historical forms of Islamic law were largely dependent—the hypothetical "reason" ('ilia) seen as underlying a particular commandment or decision (hukm) derived from the Koran or more commonly from the many reported actions and sayings of the Prophet was "extracted" or "deduced" from that particular precedent and then "extended" to a wider range of supposedly analogous cases.

Ibn ^?Arabi^?s personal criticisms of qivas, here and elsewhere, specifically presuppose the continued presence of the Prophet (i.e., of His spiritual Reality) as realized among the accomplished Sufis (the ahl al-kashf or "People of Unveiling"), as he explained in secion II-7 above (= III, 335). His conception of the proper modalities and conditions of a "living" and truly authoritative understanding and transmission of hadith (by the saints), based on the same types of spiritual insight discussed here with regard to the Mahdi, is more fully summarized in chapter 29 (O.Y. Ill, 240-241), on the "Ahl al-Bavt" and Salman. As stressed by M. Chodkiewicz, "Ibn ^?Arabi, la lettre et la loi," pp. 29-30 (in Actes du collogue Mystique, culture et societe', ed. M. Meslin, Paris, 1983), Ibn ^?Arabi—while rejecting qivas (and taqlid, for reasons detailed at II, 165) for himself—does not necessarily reject the usage of qivas by those who do not fulfill these (admittedly rather rare) conditions; thus his position should not be confused with the universal (if problematic) condemnation of qivas typical of the Zahiri legal school. See the more complete discussion of these problems in our article cited at n. 3 above.

^[ci]The Koranic passage (Kor. 80:1-10) alluded to here is a particularly striking illustration of Ibn ^?Arabi^?s argument that man—at least in his ordinary, "uninspired" state—should not pretend to decipher the essential "reasons" underlying God's specifically stated commands and prohibitions, much less attempt to extend those principles beyond their explicitly prescribed areas of application. In these verses the Prophet is reproached for having distractedly turned away a poor blind man who came asking about faith while he was talking with an important notable—i.e., for judging on the basis of outward appearances—and reminded that "perhaps (the blind man) will grow in purity or come to remember (God)...."

^[cii]The full verse is again assumed in this powerful allusion: "Or do they they have partners who prescribe as law for them concerning Religion that about which God is unaware [or 'does not permit']?" This paragraph therefore explains in detail the basic principles underlying Ibn 'Arabi's remarks (in section II-7 and at the very beginning of this chapter) concerning the hatred of the fuqaha' for the Mahdi, as well as his impassioned assertions (at notes 82-87 and 97 above) that in fact even the most well-meaning of them unconsciously "make up lies about God."

^[ciii]I.e., giyas, in the legalistic sense—and above all with reference to its intrinsic suppositions about the very nature of religion—described in the preceding paragraphs. For the Mahdi's refusal to act on the basis of both qivas and even explicit scriptural stipulations (nass), where he has not been directly inspired by God, see also section II-7 (at notes 75-77) above.

^[civ]Hence the more profound justification of Ibn 'Arabi's earlier insistence (at n. 95 above) that all that is not most explicitly commanded or forbidden is "permitted" (mubahF in an unrestricted, essentially positive sense very different from its usage in the legal categories of the fuqaha'. This is brought out more powerfully in the further allusions at the end of this chapter (= translations at the beginning of section III, notes 109-117) to the saints' theophanic perception of the religiously unrestricted—indeed intrinsically "paradisiac" and "marvelous"—nature of everything in the world not bound by the rare explicit divine indications to the contrary. See the many further references to this key dimension of Ibn 'Arabi's religious thought in our article cited at n. 3 above.

^[cv]This hadith is mentioned by both Bukhari (Tdsam, 2) and Muslim (Hajj, 411). As Ibn 'Arabi explains in his brief chapter 262 "On the Inner Knowledge of the Sharia" (II, 561-562), the Sharia includes both "the precepts (ahkam) God prescribed of His own accord fibtida'anV' and "what was prescribed at the request of the community," so that "if they had not requested it, then that (precept or commandment) would not have been sent down." The Prophet's saying was therefore intended to avoid the unnecessary proliferation of this latter category of religious prescriptions and the resulting burden of obligation on His community. Elsewhere (II, 162-166; ch. 88 "On the Inner Knowledge of the Secrets of the Principles of the Precepts of the Shaf"), Ibn 'Arabi points out the parallel between this hadith and the following Koranic injunction: "O those who have faith, do not ask about things which, if they were revealed to you, would harm you. And if you ask about them when the Qur'an is being sent down, they will be revealed to you.... For a people before you did ask (such) things, and after that they began to disbelieve in them." (Kor. 5:101-102). In the same section (II, 165) he explains in detail his conviction "that the Lawgiver only wanted to reduce (the burden of religious prescriptions) of this Community." (See also following note.)

^1Q6hukm al-asl: In chapter 88 (II, 165; see preceding note), Ibn 'Arabi clearly states that this primordial state of affairs is "that there is no taklif (i.e., divinely imposed religious obligation) and that God created for us the totality of everything on earth...." In other words, as far as the Sharia is concerned, everything God has not expressly forbidden or made obligatory is implicitly permitted (mubah) for man's delight in His creation—as Ibn 'Arabi had already indicated at notes 97 and 103 above.

The grammatical subject of these sentences could also be the Prophet, but appears more likely to be the Mahdi, judging from the context of the following sentences (which are not all translated here).

^[cvii]See the longer discussion of this eternal reality underlying the actions and prescriptions of each of the prophets (anbiya'. a category which for Ibn 'Arabi also includes the accomplished saints, the awliva') and lawgiving messengers at n. 76 and in the opening description of the Mahdi (at n. 8) above. The few phrases omitted here (337.28-30) simply reiterate what was said at the beginning of this section concerning the Mahdi's inspired foreknowledge of what will happen to his subjects.

^[cviii]Ibn 'Arabi does not even mention the Mahdi's "Helpers" here, or how this statement is to be reconciled with his earlier remarks (see notes 1 and 15) concerning their essential collective role in providing the Mahdi's "right guidance" with regard to these matters. For some of the possible reasons for this omission, see our study of "Ibn 'Arabi's 'Esotericism'..." cited at n. 3 above.

The few untranslated lines of this concluding section (337.31-338.2) stress points already mentioned repeatedly in this chapter: the inner identity of the Mahdi with the spirit of Muhammad, from whom he "inherits" his spiritual knowledge through divine inspiration, and his special status as a "perfect follower" of Muhammad, likewise divinely protected from error (ma'sum) in all his judgments.

^[cix]III, 338.3-340.12. The complete list here includes some fifty-four kinds of spiritual knowledge, and the descriptions translated in this section make up items 8-10, 23 and 24 in that enumeration.

^[cx]"Burden of anguish" = harak referring here to the inner state of constraint, oppression, anxiety, distress, etc. that usually accompanies and underlies (whether consciously or not) much of our everyday psychic and outward activity. In connection with the subject of this chapter and the special divine inspiration characterizing the Mahdi (or his "Helpers"), a number of Koranic verses stress that there is "no harai for you in Religion" (al-Din; see Kor. 22:78; etc.) or in the "Book sent down" from God (Kor. 7:2), and that this state of inner distress is a sign of those "wandering astray," while it is removed from those whom God "guides rightly" and who inwardly surrender to Him (Kor. 6:125).

ⁱⁿThis phrase could also be translated as "to kill his nafs" (i.e., in Sufi psychology, the "carnal soul," al-nafs al-'ammara. directly responsible for this sense of oppression and anxiety), in the hope of eliminating this torment.

^[cxii]See, among others, the longer discussions of this immediate experience of Paradise (by the Prophet and other saints) as a reality already present in this world in the translations from chapters 302 (III, 12-13) and 351 (III, 12-13) in the section on Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of eschatology.

^[cxiii]adab, the proper respect or "principles of conduct" regarding God in every aspect of one's spiritual life, whose expression, as Ibn 'Arabi indicates here, obviously varies greatly according to one's inner state or "rank." For example one of the later "kinds of knowledge" in this section (the 25th in the list, p. 339.23-25; not translated here) concerns the kind of adab the person in this (very high) station should follow with God in order to avoid "taking for granted" the gift of true faith he is enjoying.

^[cxiv]An allusion to the central, recurrent theme in Ibn 'Arabi of the beatific "divine vision" of the true Knowers ('urafa, muhaqqiqun. etc.) who fully experience the theophanic nature of all Being and therefore realize that they are seeing, in a sense, with "God's" eye, i.e., the "eye of the Heart." See all the translations in the eschatology section here. The next phrase in this sentence is a reminder that the regard of such individuals is not always, or even primarily, turned toward the visible world.

^[cxv]Or "good" or "virtuous" actions: the Arabic root hasan (translated with forms of "beautiful" throughout this paragraph) covers much the same semantic range as the Greek kalos. (Likewise the term translated as "ugly" could also be understood as "vile" or "displeasing" in a more strictly moral sense.)

This final phrase—as so often in Ibn 'Arabi—could equally be understood with God as the subject: ."..for He comes to meet (the true seer), by His very Essence, with beautiful Actions."

^[cxvi]Here, as so often, Ibn 'Arabi (following al-Ghazali), adapts for his own Sufi purposes a formula of the mutakallimun which, as he was well aware, derives from an intellectual context having little to do directly with the profound spiritual "unveiling" he is pointing to here.

^[cxvii]The latter phrase no doubt alludes to the fact that the verbal root translated here as "ugly" (q-b- h) appears only once in the entire Koran (at 28:42, applied to the fate of Pharaoh and his army on the Day of Resurrection). The fundamental object of Ibn 'Arabi's remarks here and in the following section—as in his earlier criticisms of those jurists who "make up lies about God" (at notes 80, 82, 95-104, etc. above)—is the way the endless (and for the most part unconscious) likes, dislikes and particular "judgments" of each individual soul tend to obscure man's primordial, innate perception of the intrinsic perfection and beauty of God's creation.

^[cxviii]kharq al-'ada: this expression (again borrowed from kalam and used in a radically different, quite concrete spiritual context) is used throughout this section as a sort of pun corresponding to two very different conceptions of the divine "habit" or "custom" Г ad a). Ordinarily this term refers to the unenlightened perception of the usual course of affairs in the world, which the "people of habits" (ashab al-'awa'id) heedlessly take for granted: hence the usual understanding of kharq al-'ada as some exceptional "miracle," "prodigy" or "supernatural" event departing from that unconscious norm. But the true Knowers—those who, as in the preceding paragraph, actually "see things as they really are"—are profoundly aware of the genuinely "miraculous" re-creation of the world at every instant, of the "marvelous," never-repeated theophany of Being in all Its infinite self-manifestations.

^[cxix]rijal al-ghavb: the ability to see these mysterious spiritual beings even when they do not wish to be seen was earlier described as one of the basic signs of the "penetrating (spiritual) vision" characterizing this particular mystical state in section II-1 (n. 30) above.

^[cxx]Here (III, 339.21) Ibn 'Arabi also mentions that he is writing down this story in the year 635 (i.e., only three years before his death and shortly before the completion of this final recension of the Futuhat); lacking a critical edition of this section, we do not know how much of this present chapter may have been added to the first version.

^[cxxi]See the earlier discussion of this special group of angels who seek out the gatherings of those who are remembering or invoking God (or the Koran) at section II-6, notes 59-60 above.

^[cxxii]Given Ibn 'Arabi's repeated claims, throughout the main body of this chapter, for the superior insight and spiritual authority of the accomplished saints—as opposed to the so-called 'ulama'—as the only fully qualified "interpreters" (see section II-3, notes 38-39) of the truly divine Law and as the genuine "heirs" of the larger body of religious tradition, this section provides some extremely important guidelines for determining the degree to which the wali should directly attempt to communicate his "revealed" spiritual inspirations beyond himself and those who voluntarily seek out his guidance. Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of this practically crucial problem is discussed in detail in our article mentioned at n. 3 above. It also underlines another essential difference separating the lawgiving "messenger" (rasul/sharf) ordered to fulfill a universal mission from the rest of the "prophets" (anbiya'k including the awliva'.

Perhaps even more important in this context are what these criteria imply about the even more limited spiritual utility of any sort of "disputing" about religion for those who would not pretend to have reached this rare and lofty station....

^[cxxiii]I.e., the "saints" (awliva') or accomplished Sufis, such as those having realized this high spiritual station. Again there is a typical ambiguity in the expression (intama Да) translated here as "depend on," which can also mean, especially in everyday speech, "belong to" in the sense of joining or adhering to a particular group; Ibn 'Arabi used the same verb in that sense earlier in this chapter to allude to the followers of the different "schools" of Islamic law and kalam (and their founders). Here he clearly implies that there is no point in even raising this question with regard to such groups, since arguing or "disputing" (jidal)—along with the underlying aim of converting others or otherwise imposing their own opinions—is inherent in their very methods and presuppositions. For the same reasons, the expression "one who has truly surrendered to God" (muslim) would of course be understood rather differently by those groups.

^[cxxiv]This is a literal translation of the Koranic expression, which colloquially means simply "in a friendly or polite manner"—i.e., not, for example, using the methods followed by (among others) the supporters of the juridical and theological schools involved in the bloody sectarian disputes Ibn 'Arabi alludes to at n. 87 above.

^[cxxv]I.e., he is really trying to establish his own self-righteousness and satisfy the cravings of his own nafs rather than actually carrying out the divine Will (as expressed in their current state of unreceptiveness). This section echoes Ibn ^?Arabi^?s earlier remarks (see section II-5, and notes 51-53 for the Koranic background) stressing the essential distinction between the general prophetic task of "communicating” the divine Message and the even more difficult responsibility of acting as a divinely-appointed "judge” (hakim).