The Fourth Political Theory

beyond left and right but against the center

Russia, for its part, is seeking to implement a new geopolitical axis with Beijing and Tehran, a factor of multipolar balance of power opposed to the Atlanticist endeavors. The Chinese, after long procrastination, are no longer hiding their desire to “de- Americanize the world.”  Yet, the future of Russia, a great power, albeit still fragile, in a similar way as China, with its own inner contradictions, remains uncertain. Countries of Eastern Europe are still hesitant  as to which path to follow—all the more so as Germany is seeking to replace the former USSR as a federating factor in Eastern and Central Europe.

We are witnessing a restructuring of the forms of world domination. The United States, with its financial markets, its armed forces, its language and its culture industries remains the leading world power. Its economic impact, however, is decreasing bit by bit (its share of global industrial output has fallen from 45% in 1945 to 17.5% today), with the dollar representing today only a third of world trade in comparison to more than a half in 2000.  The process of “de- dollarization” has already and simultaneously begun, in oil and gas trading and on the monetary front. Russia and China, emulated by other Third World countries, are using more and more their national currencies in trade and investment. The project of trade in energy and raw materials, without resorting to the dollar, is beginning to take shape. Meanwhile, the purchase of gold is gathering momentum. The advent of a new international reserve currency, designed to replace the dollar, seems inevitable.

From our examination thus far, it should be obvious that there are too many misconceptions about Alexander Dugin’s thought being circulated among Right-wingers. These misconceptions are being used to dismiss the value of his work and deceive members of Right-wing groups into believing that Dugin is a subversive intellectual who must be rejected as an enemy. Many other important Right-wing intellectuals have been similarly dismissed among certain circles, due to practices of a kind of in-group gleichschaltung, closing off any thinker who is not seen as readily agreeable. It is important to overcome such tendencies and support an intellectual expansion of the Right, which is the only way to overcome the present liberal-egalitarian hegemony. People need to take a more careful and unbiased look at Dugin’s works and ideas, as with other controversial thinkers. Of course, Dugin is not without flaws and imperfections (nor is any other thinker), but these flaws can be overcome when his thought is balanced with that of other intellectuals, especially the Revolutionary Conservatives and the New Rightists.

From the moment of its inception in the 1920s, Eurasianism has always opposed the global domination of the West, European universalism, and supported the uniqueness of the Russian civilization. Therefore, Eurasianism is, indeed, an anti-Western ideology in the sense that it rejects the Western society’s right to impose its criteria of good and evil as the universal norm. Russia is an independent Orthodox-Eurasian civilization, rather than the periphery of Europe, insisted Eurasianists, following their ideological predecessors, the Slavophiles, along with other Russian conservatives.

Gradually, Eurasianism was enriched with the methods of classic geopolitics that were based upon the dualism of the Land and Sea civilizations. Englishman Halford Mackinder introduced this concept in the first half of the twentieth century; it was further developed by American strategists such as Nicholas Spykman and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Here, Russia serves as the core of the Land civilization, Eurasia’s Heartland, and is thus doomed to carry out a centuries-old battle against the Anglo-Saxon world. In the past, its core was the British Empire, and, from the second half of the twentieth century onward, this was the United States. Therefore, Eurasianists oppose Western hegemony, American expansionism, and Liberal values and support the distinct Russian civilization, religion, and tradition. Furthermore, Eurasianists not only oppose the West, but also Russia’s own Westernizers and moderates: Liberals, first and foremost.

We can also hear the words of some indigenous masters from Brazil, saying that each person has the responsibility of making the intercultural dialogue happen inside themselves, because we can only recognize the differences as being both unsurmontable and yet all too natural. As such, this dialogue occurs only in a situation of double-endedly openness:

1. open to the culture of the Other, whom we recognize as being not an Object, but a full Subject of his own, having, then, as much right to existence as we do;

2. being entirely open to our own culture, or being open to it in its entirety, because otherwise there is no way to be fully recognized as a Subject in turn, and demandSujbec. This second point has two meanings to be conjugated:

a) it is almost impossible to be fully recognized as a Subject by the Other without an inner understanding of such;

b) it is not possible to know what to want when one does not recognize themselves as a full Subject; in this case, one easily "swallows" anything that is given to him without further thinking, becoming, by acting so, a mere Object.

Like Dugin, one discovers in Heidegger, whom Dugin routinely calls “the greatest thinker,” a combination of traditional philosophical interests with self-consciously modern concerns. But again, like Dugin, Heidegger was a reactionary modernist, someone who combatted modernity by underlining its defects and shallowness and by trying to prove that the modern enterprise was headed in a very bad direction. Heidegger tried to do this without returning to metaphysical assumptions that he believed belonged to a vanished past. This, too, as in the case of Dugin, is not as simple as it would first appear. There is something backward-looking in both thinkers, as the past is for them a source of creativity. This is totally different from the kind of “cultural conservative” this writer has often encountered: a tedious eccentric who manifests his “conservatism” by making himself the butt of gentle jokes. Such a person may frequent clubs where tea and crumpets are served or may introduce himself as a liturgical traditionalist with an ostentatious interest in Gothic architecture, but he is, above all, an expert at staying out of controversy that could threaten his career or social calendar.

According to Prof Alexander Dugin, Vladimir Putin stands at a crossroads. Throughout his career as the President of Russia, Putin has attempted to balance two opposing sides of his political nature: one side is a liberal democrat who seeks to adopt Western-style reforms in Russia and maintain good relations with the United States and Europe, and the other is a Russian patriot who wishes to preserve Russia's traditions and reassert her role as one of the great powers of the world. According to Dugin, this balancing act cannot go on if Putin wishes to enjoy continuing popular support among the Russian people. Putin must act to preserve Russia's unique identity and sovereignty in the face of increasing challenges, both from Russian liberals at home and from foreign powers. Russia is no longer strong enough to stand on her own, he writes. In order to do this, Russia must cooperate with other dissenting powers who oppose the new globalist order of liberalism to bring about a multipolar world, in which no single nation wields supreme power, but rather several major powers keep each other in balance. Russia is crucial to this effort, in Dugin's view, and indeed, its own survival as a unique and independent civilisation is dependent on a geopolitical shift away from the unipolar world represented by America's unchecked supremacy. This fascinating book, written by an informal advisor to Putin and a Kremlin insider, is the first of its kind in English.

http://www.arktos.com/our-authors/alexander-dugin/alexander-dugin-putin-...

The hatred of Strelkov is that by an enemy race, not in the biological, but in the spiritual sense. The race of technologists, con artists, bureaucrats, manipulators, and merchants. Werner Sombart used to say that there are two types of people: the race of merchants and that of heroes. Europe of Modernity is the result of triumphant merchants (capitalism) over the race of heroes (Middle Ages). Strelkov is the Russian Middle Ages. After all, Orthodoxy itself cannot be “modern”: this would be a parody, a simulacrum. It could either be Ancient or Medieval. “Modernity” is the patrimony of the Antichrist. Thus, Strelkov is from that which once passed. But not that which once passed, and is no more, but rather that which truly was, and still is, as the core of our souls, as an arcane center of the Russian identity.

We aren't going to limit ourselves by annexing Crimea. That for sure. Yesterday the reunion with the Crimea was a victory for us. Today this is infinitely small thing. Rates rise. The peoples of South-East of Ukraine are waking up gradually. It is exactly that "long at harnessing" and "swift in riding" (old Russian proverb) .

All the important is yet to come. We do not expect a quick victory. Everything is to be paid for. Now we are witnesses of a birth of a new political reality, that is why everything acquires a special significance. This is not a technical enterprise, not a bargain. This is history itself. The struggle for Ukraine - is a struggle for reunification of slavic peoples. Today it is clear that this reunion should be geographically different. Galicia and a number pro-western areas, and as well a large part of Kiev do not strive to Unity. We understand that. We won't drag anyone by force. But we will not leave nor betray ours. However, for everything you have to fight and struggle to create a new political and historical reality.

The concept of a “Russian civilization” undergirds the vision of the Russian Eurasianists. This is both a political theory and a source of foreign policy decisions. The “imperial mission” of a society is not about local values, but cosmic ideas. In politics, these “imperial ideologies” serve as the foundation of global rule.

Eurasianism as foreign policy refers to Russian geopolitical space.  Russia is a “cosmos,” it takes smaller “solar systems” under its wing to create a loose federation of allied nations and states.  In some instances, it rejects the very notion of “nation-statism” in that a true civilization can be only a federation, not a state.

Prior to the well known Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism has a rich ideological heritage unknown to those who cannot read Russian.  PM Bitsilli (1953) took a broad look at global history.  “Rhythm” is specific to a people.  It is dialectical both in that it is becoming (rather than being) and takes the familiar trinity as undifferentiated unity – fragmentation – reflective unity.  This also was essential to the metaphysics of Karsavin.  Rhythms differ radically, but they still partake of the same formula.

Today, this question is particularly acute: what is the Russian State at the moment? Does it belong to its Narod? Or is it mechanical? This is the principal dilemma for Putin, personally, as the head if this State with a vague dual identity. The rise of patriotism in Russia, reunification with Crimea, and the confrontation with the West are all signs of a People’s—Narod’s presence. Cynical political technologists (political scientists), the all-powerful and constantly lying top-level managers, mad corruption, dominant Liberalism, anti-Narod oligarchy, Westernizing on the part of the intelligentsia and the elites all point to the State of death, the State of survival. Putin has been balancing on this narrow fence between the State of a People—Narod and that of the mechanical and alienated Liberal elite for the past 14 years. He kept taking steps in one direction, then another. Of course, without a certain kind of support for Novorossia, today’s picture—even if critically difficult—would not be possible. Were Putin solely on the side if a dead State, Russia Corp., he would have betrayed everything himself long ago. But this is not the case.

Each symbol is ambiguous. In geography, the eight-pointed star is the compass, something that provides orientation, introducing order in the seemingly chaotic space, the geometric symbol of the Universe. In Orthodoxy, it is eight-pointed star of the Virgin Mary; It is found in religious icons. It is the morning star and evening star, a guide and point of orientation. It is the star of Lucifer, Ishtar and Venus, and a powerful symbol of “chaos magic”… In the Bhagavad Gita, Lord Krishna says: “Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Spirit, Intelligence and Ego are my eight separated energies.” The symbol is basically an over-rational one. It’s impossible to explain in a rational way, at least not from the limited position of human beings. Our understanding of symbols is therefore necessarily incomplete, and their meanings, from our perspective, are contradictory. The symbol is possible to know, but can not be explained. Science is, of course, an inferior method of cognition. Science is, after all, constantly redefined, changing their methods and findings. A rational approach is necessary, but is just not enough. Tradition is over-rational, and their learning over-temporal. Rene Guenon speaks about their superhuman origin.

Only a rare few in the alternative right knew Alexander Dugin before the publication and translation of his book, The Fourth Political Theory, in 2012. Suddenly, the contents of this book became the subject of lively discussion and he was hailed as “arguably the most prominent New Right thinker in the world.”  With the exception of Michael O’Meara at Counter Currents, most of the reviews were very positive or at least sympathetic.  After reading reviews, interviews, blogs, articles, and listening to some video lectures by Dugin, I decided to read The Fourth Political Theory (FPT).

Through the first pages, I was fairly impressed by Dugin’s laconic treatment of the way liberalism had created the normative conditions for a humanity predisposed toward a world government in its “glorification of total freedom and the independence of the individual from any kind of limits, including reason, identity (social, ethnic, or even gender), discipline, and so on” (18). With the “liberation” of man from any necessary, pre-ordained membership in any community or identity, and the universal morality of human rights widely accepted, few obstacles now stood in the way of a totalitarian global market.

Being anti-communist during the Soviet era I changed my mind in 1991 in front of the liberal revolt that I’ve judged to be worse than socialism. The result of this analysis was the first serious change in my world vision: I’d broken with anti-communism concentrating on anti-liberalism, liberalism seen as the main enemy and the final incarnation of the spirit of Modernity that was always considered by me as the absolute evil (in the sense of Guenon and Evola). The victory of liberalism over communism was the proof in my eyes of its eschatological nature. So I’ve moved from more classical right traditionalism to the left traditionalism, called something national-bolshevism. It wasn’t in fact really communism or bolshevism. It was and still is a total refusal of liberalism identified as the ideology that during his fight with communists and fascists has proved to be more consistently modern and identic with the very nature, very essence of the Modernity.

First of all… First of all, I would like to say that I have never said one single word concerning Lithuania. No word at all… That doesn‘t mean that I am great friend of modern Lithuania, but that doesn‘t mean absolutely that I am enemy of Lithuania or that I have smallest form of hostility toward your people.

To say the truth, I love Lituanian identity and Baltic identity in general, I am fan of Marija Gimbutas‘ works, concerning all European identity and I think that the Baltic ethnic groups are descendents of the ancient European tribes with very particular ant very original cultural identity.

So in general I have a very positive relation towards Lithuania. So never, nowhere, not once have I mentioned any negative comment toward Lithuania, including the fact tht(that is difference from many political patriots of Russia) I have nver criticized modern Lithuania.

One can highlight four main streams of events that happened in the last week in the Ukrainian drama:

- The start of the presidential campaign and the attempt of Kiev to present “the beginning of the election cycle,” which was marked by a clash of the Poroshenko’s group against the group of Timoshenko;
- The attempt of the illegitimate pro-American grouping, which controls power in Kiev, to find a solution of the issue with neo-Nazi formations (“Right sector”, the trial of Goran);
- Diplomatic battle of Russia on international arena concerning the defense of its position in the Crimea and the idea of federalization;
- Revolutionary events on the South East which happened this weekend and preceding it uncertain repression of the civil society activists from South East who obey the illegitimate “power” in Kiev.

There are some people who like to play up the notion of an intimate bond between the United States and the former British Empire.  This should not be so.  Think of the rhetoric surrounding World War II — “We had to intervene and stop Nazi Germany from taking over the world and committing genocide.”  The truth to these statements is irrefutable.  Hitler was an evil maniac who enslaved an entire continent and needed to be stopped.  However, when it comes to genocide and imperial ambition, the British beat the Nazis to it. The Union Jack is stained with blood: the blood of genocide, that is — the genocide of Irishmen, Scotsmen, Boers, Indians, Australians, and Native Canadians.

Not just in the US the mainstream media was broadcasting these fairy tales. In Germany also we “witnessed” a Russian invasion with tanks and lots of war material in Crimea. When I arrived in Simferopol I started searching for the Russian invasion. And I found out it took place but just on our western TV screens. Instead of those depressing “occupation scenes” I saw happy people in “reunification-fever”. Crimeans were looking forward to the referendum day.

The crisis in Ukraine is still far from over, but it is clear that it is the most important central event in the early 21st century to date, much more important than Libya, the invasion of Afghanistan, or the question of the future of Iraq. Even Syria can be measured with it. The crisis is not yet resolved, but some answers are already apparent: Crimea is Russian again. The fate of the South East of Ukraine is now almost certain: it certainly will not be part of a future unitary Ukraine, Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic military alliance. There was during the rebellion a (pro) Russian population, which articulated its requirements for many unexpected “Russian Springs”. Southeast – Novorusija can become part of a future federal or confederal Ukraine, independent states dependent on the Russian Federation – but only as interim solution – and in the future an integral part of Russia.

The war against Russia is currently the most discussed issue in the West. At this point it is only a suggestion and a possibility, but it can become a reality depending on the decisions taken by all parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict – Moscow, Washington, Kiev, and Brussels.

I don’t want to discuss all the aspects and history of this conflict here. Instead I propose to analyze its deep ideological roots. My conception of the most relevant events is based on the Fourth Political Theory, whose principles I have described in my book under the same name that was published in English by Arktos Media in 2012.

Therefore I will not examine the war of the West on Russia in terms of its risks, dangers, issues, costs or consequences, but rather in an ideological sense as seen from the global perspective. I will therefore meditate on the sense of such a war, and not on the war itself (which may be either real or virtual).

The concept people (le peuple, Volk) is according Alain de Benoist the subject of 4PT. That doesn't deny Dasein as subject, because Haidegger said "Dasein existiert völkisch". Being t/here exists as people, through people. To be is to be German, French, Italian, Hungarian, Serb, Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian and so on. We cannot exist without being some one - individual without content. It is machine, not human being. Machine can't exist (in Heideggerian sense). It is simply at hand. So "to be", "to exist" means to be ethnically, culturally, linguistically. Völkisch. Thus the dialogue among different people (each one of them existing differently) is our main goal. This dialogue between German and French, Russian and Polish or Ukrainian, Hungarian and Romanian, Croatian and Serbian is very very difficult and delicate. But we need to forward it and develop it. On the collective basis - not on the individual level as liberals suggest. So it is not peace, or tolerance, or friendship. It is understanding of other without necessarily identifying with him, preserving in this understanding our own identity. 

Geopolitically speaking Land wins the Sea and only AFTER that its parts decide who is Heartland. If the inner struggle starts BEFORE the victory over first political theory (capitalism and anglo-saxon thalassocratic Empire of money and lie) or even if the communists are declared the enemy number one instead of liberals, the fascism helps the liberals to win and pushes the communists on the side of the MAIN EVIL. So the fascism was absolutely wrong here.
These four points are essential negative moments. There were other less important as the theoretical weight. There were some positive moments: anti-capitalism, anti-materialism and other anti-modern features. That is valid for real historic fascism with all its terrible and fascinating (for some) aspects. 

The new millennium dawning on the horizon of History suggests us a major paradigmatic upheaval, a reversal of the categories of thought that, at a time of extreme political and ideological confusion, requires a rethink. At the threshold of a new era, a new global disorder stands out: mankind must face the approaching of several cultural universes, pushed towards a collision and a mutual annihilation by the new world-wide perspective. Economy, designed according to bourgeois criteria, demonstrates its finiteness, projecting the future of humanity towards a peak of exploitation and alienation. Peoples, despoiled of any decision-making power and sovereignty, render any authority to minorities who direct world affairs according to their own interest. Cultures and religions die on the altars of postmodern simulacra. The new law is chaos.