During the "Unified Cultural Media Code and Transnational Media Projects" session at the CIS forum "Media Development in a Changing World," Dugin stated that, in his view, the CIS countries currently lack a unified media code, though one is necessary.
In essence, we are changing our ideology for the third time in 35 years. Until the early 1990s, society was under the dictatorship of Marxism-Leninism. This was obligatory, and (even if formally) everything was built upon it — politics, economics, science, education, and law. Everything, really.
Alexander Dugin contends that Russia’s current statehood is just a step in achieving Victory in Ukraine, a destiny that will fully realize Russia’s essence.
Winners are not judged. Everyone else is. The only exception is made for winners. For our truth to prevail — in both the grandest sense (civilizational, philosophical, religious) and the smallest (simple facts like shelling, casualties, invasions, attacks on nuclear facilities) — we must, at the very least, win.
Alexander Dugin argues that the world is nearing a point of no return with liberalism and calls for a radical shift towards traditional values and patriotic reforms to build a new Russian society.
North Korea is a beautiful thing. Interestingly, the Korean word 'Juche' (주체) is a deeply philosophical term and means 'subject' or even the Heideggerian Dasein. It has everything else included in it: independence, freedom, civil sovereignty.
We will not be able to understand the full depth of the current confrontation without philosophical reflection. Philosophers have always interpreted war as something necessary. Heraclitus speaks of war as the "father of things": πόλεμος πάντων μεν πατήρ εστί, πάντων δε βασιλεύς. War has always constituted the world and space. Without war, without division, the world is impossible.
Alexander Dugin asserts that President Putin’s inauguration marks a new stage, emphasising traditional values and multipolarity while rallying allies like China and India against Western hegemony.
Alexander Dugin discusses the necessity of revising humanitarian education in Russia to highlight Russian civilisation’s importance, safeguard it from Western biases, and proposes legal measures against disrespect towards Russian identity.
The spirit of the Donbass is the realisation of the Imperium, it is a paradigm of undivided theoria and praxis, it is a model but even more a categorical and binding archetype for conceiving, planning, concretising and realising the ideological clash of the culture war, that Kulturkampf through which the Italian and European world too will know and will want to free themselves from the global and unipolar oppression of American hegemony.
This term of Putin's presidential term is crucial. It is not just ordinary elections, but decisive moment of modern Russian history. Putin has arrived at summit of his historic career at the head of Russia.
Moscow is also a front-line city, just like Donetsk, Sevastopol, and Belgorod. A country at war cannot have peaceful cities. It is better to realise this now and deeply. Of course, in a warring country, special behavioural measures and rules must be introduced.
The adoption of Orthodoxy by Vladimir, the Grand Prince of Kiev, marked the starting point of the Christian cycle in Russian history, which spans almost the entire history of Russia — with the exception of the Soviet period and the era of liberal reforms. This cycle represents a complex and multidimensional process, which would be inaccurate to describe as a gradual and unidirectional penetration of Orthodox-Byzantine culture into the folk environment, simultaneously displacing pre-Christian (‘pagan’) beliefs.
Militarisation means shifting society onto a military footing. The scale and main directions of militarisation are open to debate as they depend on the specific historical and geopolitical situation, economic capabilities and resources, political ideology, and cultural dominants. When a country is at peace and its vital interests and very existence are not threatened, excessive militarisation is unnecessary and superfluous.
Everyone understands that on the fronts of the Special Military Operation (SMO), a new elite of Russia is being forged. This is the estate of bravery (Hegel), which is to reboot the state. It is clear that the war heroes at the front are already divided into future strata: pure warriors, commanders, inventors, creators, strategists, economists. Among them is also the forming estate of ideologists. A bright symbol of theirs was Vladlen Tatarsky; many today rally around the front-line philosopher Korobov-Latyncev.
Contemporary social science in Russia needs to catch up in understanding the changes occurring in the country and in forming a sovereign worldview, and it needs to be accelerated, philosopher Alexander Dugin told journalists at the 5th Congress of the Russian Society of Political Scientists in Svetlogorsk (Kaliningrad region).
In Russia, the year 2024 has been proclaimed the Year of the Family. Clearly, in this area, things are quite dire for us. The alarming rates of divorce, abortion, and declining birth rates represent a national catastrophe. If we take the Year of the Family seriously, relying on the classics (but not the liberal or communist ones, as they are likely to advise something that will only hasten the disintegration of the family), we should simultaneously return to our roots and take a step forward.
Certainly, there are those who voluntarily and consciously went to war, already possessing an ideology. There are the convinced rightists (Orthodox, monarchists, imperialists). There are the leftists (Stalinists, anti-globalists). There are left-rightists — National Bolsheviks. By the way, Prigozhin articulated, in many respects, exactly the left-right discourse — justice and strength.
The adoption of Orthodoxy by the Grand Duke of Kiev Vladimir was the starting point of Christian historicity, which covers almost the entire history of Russia - with the exception of the Soviet period and the era of liberal reforms. This historicity itself was a complex and multidimensional process, which it would be wrong to describe as a gradual and unidirectional penetration of Byzantine Orthodox culture into the popular environment, in parallel with the displacement of pre-Christian ('pagan') ideas. Rather, we are talking about different phases of the temporal synthesis between Byzantinism and East Slavic demetriac civilisation, phases determined by the different correlation of the main structures - Byzantine ideology at the elite level and the reception of Christianity by the people as such.
On the threshold of the jubilee congress of the World Russian People’s Council in the Kremlin, which is dedicated to the Russian World, it is necessary to address the very concept of “Russian World” in a little more detail.
Certainly most thinking individuals would agree that in the 1990s, the Russian state was taken over by adversaries who imposed external control over it – over our entire society. Its overarching name is liberalism. Not some ‘bad liberalism’, ‘distorted liberalism’, or ‘pseudo-liberalism’, but simply liberalism. No other kind of liberalism exists. Russian liberals became nodes in this occupation network.
Today the questions, what is Russian philosophy, has it existed, does it exist now, and will it exist in the future, are pressing. But there is an even deeper question, is Russian philosophy possible at all?
We must do a thought experiment and imagine: what else - other than a nuclear attack - could the West do to us that is at war with us? What sanctions to impose? Who to expel? How to humiliate us? Kick us out of where? Deprive us of what? (We are not considering a nuclear attack, because they won't do it, and if they do, it won't matter, because we will do it too).